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Robert Ackrill, Department of Economics, University of Nottingham
The Common Agricultural Policy has been
operated by the EC for over 30 years. It readily
lends itself to simple mlcroeconomic analysis,
which is the main purpose of this article. The article
analyses the policy, focussjng on how it has
become such a contentious issue within the EC,
how attempts have been made to reform the
policy, and in which direction the policy could
move in the 1990's.
Introduction
For a variety of reasons, the European
Communities (EC) has in recent years become an
important focus for economtc ana lysis. (1) The most
important development has been the movement
towards closer economic integration between the
member states of the EC, known as the 1992
programme.(2J There has, however, been one
policy operated by the EC for a number of years
that has continually put the EC in the public eye;
that is, the operation and effects of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). This is the means by
which the EC provides financial support for its
farmers. It has been popularly associated with
massive budgetary expenditures and the infamous
'mountains' and 'lakes' of surplus products as
diverse as cereals, skimmed milk powder, beef and
alcohol. These problems have, of themselves,
caused great consternation, and have brought forth
a number of attempts to correct imbalances in
agricultural production and the resulting rising
expenditures. However, these problems have wide
implications. For the success of the 1992
programme, a larger EC budget will be required, to
fund larger and new policies (for example greater
regional spending, and the expansion of the EC's
activities into area like research and development,
and new high-technology industries). This must be
accompanied by an effective reform of the CAP in
order to ensure the larger budget is not simply
swallowed up by ever-expanding support costs for
agricu 'tu re.
In this article, simple microeconomic theory is
used to consider the principles underlying the
operation of the CAP, the reasons why the levels of
surpluses and budgetary expenditures have risen
over time as El result, and how the reforms
implemented to try and control the growth of
agricu Itu raI output and expenditures actua lIy
operate. Although reference will be made to a
number of the different products supported under
the CAP, the main reference will be to cereals,
because of its importance to farmers across the EC,
both as a final product and as an input into other
production processes, notably as a feed input into
livestock production.
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Why Support Agriculture?
Most developed economies' governments
intervene in agriCUlture to some degree, and with a
variety of aims in mind. The two principal motives
stated are to counter unstable market prices and
support farmers' incomes. Taking the question of
price stability first, the nature of the agricultural
production process means that for most products,
arable and livestock, one production cycle lasts
several months. Thus, ceteris paribus, supply is
relatively price inelastic in the short run.
Moreover, there is a relatively low income
elasticity of demand for food, so that in the high-
income Western economies, a relatively low
proportion of income spent goes on food. Thus
food takes a smaller and smaller proportion of total
consumer expenditure over time. This, coupled
with the fact that unprocessed farm products face
relatively price inelastic demand (even when a
processed form of food may face relatively elastic
demand), as well as the more obvious point that
'food' in total has no close substitutes, results in
farmers facing a relatively price inelastic demand
schedule. It therefore follows that, given inelastic
demand and supply schedules, changes in either
demand or supply will result in proportionately
greater changes in the equilibrium price. Moreover,
whilst demand tends to be relatively stable over
time, supply can fluctuate quite significantly, given
its reliance on such external factors as the climate
(witness, for example, the high potato prices in the
UK in 1976 when the drought of that year cut
harvests significantly).
The second point, that of supporting farmers'
incomes, stems (at least in part) from the argument
stated above, that in developed economies
demand for food rises more slowly than general
demand in the economy as a whole. In addition to
this, whilst consumers' expenditure on food is
rising over time, this in no way guarantees a rising
return to farmers, with the food bought by
consumers increasingly being processed
(convenience foods, TV dinners etc), Thus a larger
and larger fraction of total expenditure on food
goes on the marketing margin - processing, etc.
Moreover, technological progress acts to increase
supply over time, by developing higherayielding
varieties of seeds and improved inputs. Coupled to
relatively static demand for farmers' products, if
not for food in total, the price faced by farmers will
be driven down over time.
Support Under the CAP
The CAP has a number of different methods of
support, alt aimed at fulfilling the aims of the CAP,
as laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome.
These are: to increase agricultural productivity and
promote the optimal utilisation offactors especially
labour; to ensure thereby a fair standard of living
for the agricultural community; to stabilise
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This point also demonstrates that whilst small
cereals farmers are often cited as an example of
perfectly competitive producers, even ignoring the
impact of government intervention on this point,
this example is highly questionable. The output of
small cereals farmers can be highly differentiated.
Thus the EC imports large quantities of 'hard'
wheats, suitable for milling, whilst simultaneously
exporting larger quantities of 'soft' non-milling
wheats - all wheats, but very different in
consumption and trading at very different price





Figure 1: the Price Regime of the CAP
Over time the EC has moved from being a net
importer to being a net exporter. Demand for many
agricultural products has remained fairly stable
over time, but technological advances, encouraged
by high support prices, have continuously
increased supply.(4) Given a higher unit V1L than
export refund, being a net importer meant that this
system of supporting agriculture was originally a
net income generator for the EC. In recent years
however, as the EC has moved from being a net
importer for most products to being a net exporter
(the situation shown in Figure 11, so the cost of
supporting agriculture has risen. Although the unit
VIL is still greater than the unit export refund, a far
greater quantity of many products is exported than
imported.
Moreover, not only will greater quantities of the
surplus products be exported, requiring greater
expenditure on export refunds, but for most
products, greater quantities will also be sold into
lntervention.re'Thus expenditures rise here as well,
to cover the operations involved in moving the
products into and out of store, as welt as the costs
of keeping them there.
Therefore as surplus production has risen over
time for the reasons set out above, so has the level
of stocks (the 'mountains' and 'lakes' the media
have been so ready to highlight) and the costs of
the CAP, threatening, inter alia, the progress of the
EC towards the completion of the internal market in
1992.
p
supplies to consumers at reasonable prices (this
author's emphasis),
The principal method of support involves
maintaining a market price for each commodity
within the EC which is normally higher than the
price in the rest of the world and, moreover, above
the equilibrium price. Simple microeconomics
suggests that without further intervention, this
policy will result in the price charged being driven
down to the equilibrium level. In the particular case
of the CAP, there are two ways in which this high
price could be undermined, and thus there are two
distinct, but closely related, policies operated by
the ECto protect this higher price.
Firstly, the EC must protect against cheap
imports from the rest of the world entering the
Community and undermining the high EC price. It
does this by applying variable import levies (VILs)
to all imports coming into the EC. These are set by
reference to the Target Price. This is defined as the
market price at Duisburg in the Ruhr, assumed to
be the place of greatest cereals deficit in the
Community, and therefore the place with the
highest market price. From this is deducted
transport costs from Rotterdam (the main point of
import into the Community) to Duisburg. This then
gives the Threshold Price, that is, the minimum
price at which imports are allowed into the EC.
Thus the VIL is calculated as the difference between
the price of the cereals landing at Rotterdam, and
the threshold price.
Secondly, to prevent domestic over-supply from
putting excessive downward pressure on the EC
price, a system of intervention buying is available
for most products. This acts to put a floor in the
market, so that when the market price falls below
this level, then the members states, on behalf of the
EC, are obliged to buy in what farmers decide to
offer to them for': sale, subject to certain
requirements such as minimum quality and current
stock levels.(3) When the products are sold out of
intervention, they normally go for export to third
countries. Resale onto the EC market would
undermine the reason for the intervention buying
in the first place, that of domestic over-supply, by
simply adding to that over-supply. This, like all
exports to third countries, requires a payment to
cover the difference between the EC price and the
world price - the export restitution payment,
(though more commonly called the export refund
or subsidy, funding the process which is popularly
known as 'dumping'). Note that, for a number of
reasons, the unit export refund is generally lower
than the unit VIL. This system of protection
operated by the EC can be seen in Figure 1.
The Target Price 'Pt' is above the Threshold Price
'Pth' by the transport costs from Rotterdam to
Duisburg. Pin is the intervention or buying-in price,
and Pw is the world price. Sec and Dec are the EC's
supply and demand curves for this particular
commodity. What these show is that at the
institutional prices set by the EC, the EC is a net
exporter, Le. supply is greater than demand at
those prices. At the world price however, the EC
would be a net importer. Because the Intervention
Price theoretically puts a floor in the market, the
effective demand curve facing producers is abc.
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We have now established- the principles
underpinning EC support to agriculture, and how
this has led to the evolution of surpluses.
Considering the financial implications of dealing
with these surpluses. we have also seen how the
EC's expenditure on agricultural support has risen
overtime.
As a footnote to this section, it is worth noting
that the' CAP's intervention system does not
operate like a buffer-stock, where surplus
quantities are bought by the operating authority in
years when production exceeds demand, and
released onto the market in years when production
falls short of demand. This sort of system is
generally depicted in the theory as being self-
financing. With the CAP however, many products
are in structural surplus, with supply exceeding
total internal EC demand year after year at the
support price. Thus, unlike the (ideal) buffer-stock,
the CAP's intervention system is a persistent net
financial burden to the operator. This is because
year after year surplus products have to be
removed from the internal market, and then
exported directly. or placed into intervention and
exported later.
The Attempts at Reform
Because of the market developments outlined
above. and the consequent rise in expenditure, by
1984 the EC was, in a technical sense, bankrupt,
though the member states provided sufficient
short-term injections to ensure the continued
functioning of both the EC and the CAP.(6J The fact
that these additional payments were made reflects
the value placed by the member states on the EC;
rather than let this imbalance in agriculture risk the
future of the entire Community, as some
commentators suggested a budgetary crisis would,
the Community was able to continue functioning. It
was apparent, however, that this situation could
not continue indefinitely, and simply providing
more money would not solve the problem, since if
the CAP were left unchanged, the extra money
provided would simply go straight into agricultural
support.
Thus in 1984, an attempt was made to secure
both extra funds for the Budget as a whole, and
control the amount spent on agricultural support
via rules on 'budgetary discipline'. The formula
agreed was one which set an informal limit
equating the growth of agricultural expenditure to
total EC expenditure. The agricultural price
decisions (ie the setting of Pt, Pth and Pin) were to
be taken so as to respect this lower growth in
agricultural expenditure, but there was no legally
binding mechanism to guarantee the expenditure
guidelines were respected. In practice, the
measures simply failed, as the price decisions
taken left no chance of total expenditures falling
below total revenues. The lower real prices paid to
farmers were intended to slow or halt the growth in
agricultural production, but the decisions taken
were insufficient to outweigh the effects of steadily
improving technologies and so extra payments
were needed from the member states in 1984,
1985, 1986 and 1987 as production, and hence
costs. kept on rising.
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The 1988 Reforms
Finally, in February 1988 at the Summit held in
Brussels. decisions were taken that tightened the
budgetary discipline guidelines referred to earlier
and made them legally binding. It was, however, a
time when certain external (and internal) factors
were also to come to the aid of the EC. Principally,
there was a drought in the USA during the Summer
of 1988. International cereals prices tend to be
determined by US domestic policy, since it is the
dominant producer on the world market. Thus the
large fall in US output caused by the drought led to
a sharp rise in world cereal prices and so savings in
unit export refunds. Also, the seemingly inexorable
rise in EC support prices began to slow. Support
prices had been increased very dramatically during
1980/81. Indeed, for th e fi rst (and on Iy) ti me, the
prices increased in real as well as nominal terms.
Since then, however, the real price has been falling.
Indeed, the automatic increase in the nominal price
every year has now become a thing of the past,
with Pt and Pin having been frozen in nominal
terms for the last five years.
Increases in production have been driven by
yields, rather than area planted for some time now.
Thus the likely effect of recent measures such as
'set-aside', whereby farmers receive a financial
inducement to take land out of the production of
certain surplus crops, is debatable, (especially as
only arou nd 1% of the total arable area is currently
being set aside). For example, with cereals the area
planted has been declining steadily for some years,
but rising yields have outweighed this, resulting in
steadily rising production.
As mentioned earlier, a package of reform
measures known as 'stabilisers' was passed at this
Summit. This principal weapon is an automatic cut
in Pin whenever production exceeds a particular
level, known as the Maximum Guaranteed Quantity
(MGQI. This, ceteris paribus, cuts the per-unit
refund. This price cut to farmers, it is also hoped,
will slow down the rate of growth of agricultural
production - ie slow down the rate at which the
supply schedule shifts to the right over time.
Coupled to this agreement was an increase in
the EC's 'own-resources' (total revenues), felt
necessary to fund the policies needed to achieve a
single market by 31 December 1992 and extend the
number of common policies operated by the EC
beyond just the CAP.
An Assessment of the Reforms
The foregoing discussion on policy reforms
suggests that although the EC has introduced a
number of ways of trying to control agricultural
production and resultant expenditure, perhaps the
most significant feature is that the under\ying
principle of high prices He prices maintained above
their world levels) has continued. Reform has
simply consisted of a gradual lowering of this price,
in the hope that farmers will respond by producing
less, therefore yielding savings to the EC budget. If
one considers the experience of the EC's cereals
sector however, it can be suggested that this path
will prove to be ineffective. Research by this author
suggests that between the early 1970's and 1989,
the real price to cereals farmers in the EC roughly
halved. During this same period, the total area
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planted to cereals in the ECfell by around 4-5%. Yet
despite this, total cereals production rose by
approximately 33%.m
These figures suggest that the EC's current
reform policy of gradually cutting support prices
paid to farmers in order to correct market and
financial imbalances will not work. The reason can
be seen quite clearly in Figure 1, which shows
whilst the levels of the different support prices
have been changed over time, these changes have
been too small to have any significant effect on
production and expenditure levels.l8J Pin has been
cut, but it is chasing a moving target, as the steady
increase in supply pushes down the equilibrium
price.
This point is further evidenced by the market
events of late 1990 and early 1991. Following the
reforms of 1988, expenditures did fall, but against
the background of the drought in the US. Most
commentators felt that the cause of the
expenditure cut was the drought, rather than the
stabiliser reforms. The prediction was therefore
that once world production rose (with production
in the US returning to 'normal' levels, and
production elsewhere responding to the higher
world prices realised in 1988), CAP expenditures
would once again rise. This process started in
earnest in 1990, with rising surpluses in a number
of sectors, and increasing quantities of products
going into store and for export. Official stock
figures (taken at the end of the accounting year)
indicate that the highest level of cereals
intervention stocks in the EC occurred at the end of
1985, when the figure was 18.5m tonnes.f9J The
data suggest that current stock levels are already
back to that order of magnitude.
In addition to the cereals sector, a number of
other sectors are facing major difficulties. Among
these is the beef secton Here, however, the causes
of the problems are somewhat different. Firstly,
there are large quantities of cheaper beef 'entering'
the Community from the former East Germany,
resulting in more producers in the rest of the
Community trying to sell their beef into
intervention. Secondly, in the UK in particular,
demand has been affected by the BSE 'mad-cow
disease' scare, causing producers to increase their
'demand' for intervention as 'market' demand falls.
Thus it can be seen that attempts at reform have
failed de facto, because they have in no serious
way altered that fundamental underlying method
of support under the CAP. The 'adjustments' that
have been made can be seen to have failed.
Alternative Proposals to Reform
This therefore begs the question of what sort of
reforms could be implemented that would succeed
in cutting production and support expenditure. To
fully consider this issue could take years of debate
and argument. Therefore this section simply
outlines a few of the alternatives and considers
how and where they would impact on the
important variables considered above.
Firstly, there is the notion of set-aside, that is,
paying farmers to either grow nothing on a portion
of their land, or to switch production into certain
other crops. Although currently operated in a
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limited way within the EC, it faces a number of
problems. There is, for example, political
opposition to a scheme in which the farmer is
perceived as being paid to do or grow nothing,
though this could be offset by requiring farmers to
manage the set-aside land in an environmentally-
friendly way, eg by requiring the planting,
restoration and management of suitable wildlife
habitats.
A rather more immediate problem can be
highlighted by reference to data presented earlier,
which demonstrate that whilst the area planted to
cereals in the EC has fallen, the rise in yields has
offset this effect, resulting in production still rising.
To overcome this particular problem, a
considerably larger quantity of land would have to
be set aside than has been so far. To this would
have to be added a cautionary note based on the
experience of the US over many years; that is,
often it is the poorest land that is set aside, i.e, the
land with lower than average yields. Thus output is
cut by less than intended when a given area of this
poorer land is taken out of production. Moreover,
the potential environmental impact of such a policy
would also have to be considered, given that
farmers may farm the rest of their land more
intensively, as has happened in the US.
A second alternative could be a reform such as
Ray MacSharry, the Commissioner for Agriculture,
proposed in early 1991. With th is, th e troublesome
cereals sector would face large price cuts, down to
a level close to, though still just above, the world
price. As compensation, farmers would receive
direct payments, but not equal to the previous level
of support in all cases. The smallest farmers would
receive a greater degree of compensation than the
larger farmers. This reflects concerns in many parts
of Europe regarding the social significance of the
'family farm unit' within society, often over and
above purely economic allocative inefficiencies
these units may possess. Moreover, for the larger
farmers to receive their payments, they would have
to agree to set aside a given portion of their land.
For the largest farmers, this would be 35% of their
total acreage. This is known as 'cross compliance',
and is seen as one way in which environmental
elements can be incorporated into agriculture
support policies. Put crudely, the argument could
be presented to farmers that unless they protect
the environment by, say, setting aside land or
limiting fertiliser use then they would not be
eligible for financial support under the CAP.
As can be seen with this proposal, there would
be a fundamental shift in the source of support for
farmers. With the high price policy as represented
earlier, it is consumers who bear much of the
burden, by having to pay artificially high prices.
Under this reform proposal, they would pay lower
prices, with support for farmers coming
increasingly from taxpayers. This would represent
an important change, since the scheme as it now
operates is regressive, in as much as poorer people
spend a higher proportion of their income on food,
and therefore make a disproportionately large
contribution to the costs of agricultural support.
With the MacSharry proposal however, support
would better reflect people's ability to pay, since
Economics Spring 1992
much government revenue comes through income
tax, which is a proportional tax. In essence, the
reform proposals for most other sectors supported
by the CAP, for example oilseeds (rape and
sunflower in particular). and beef are the same;
that is, a significant reduction in the official support
prices as represented in Figure 1. coupled with
direct payments based on an assessment of farm
size (lend area or head .of cattle) and cross
compliance.
These proposals are attractive to economists as
they would represent an increase in the efficiency
of income transfers. One of the failings of the CAP
has been its inability to channel income support to
the poorest farmers, since the amount of support
received has historically depended on the level of
output. The MacSharry proposals represent a
targeting of income support on those smaller
farmers deemed most in need of income support,
and who also, it ought to be noted, contribute least
to the production of surpluses.
As regards controlling surplus production, the
intention is manifold. By lowering support levels to
the large 'agribusinesses', it is hoped this would
lead directly to their cutting production. It could
also be that they would cut costs by reducing the
use of inputs.f10)Furthermore, a set-aside scheme
within this package of measures would add further
to the potential fall in output possible under this
package.
Overall therefore, it may well be suggested that
from an economic perspective, this latter
alternative has many points to recommend it. It
has, however, faced very tough opposition from
within the EC. There is one very important reason
for this - the dominance of political factors over
economic factors within the EC's decision-making
process. Thus the UK sees the proposals as being
damaging to UK farming and UK farmers. As they
have, on average, larger holdings than most of
their European counterparts, they would receive
lower support (regardless of their potentially lesser
need for that support). On the continent, however,
there is 'social' opposition to the idea of direct
payments to farmers from taxpayers via the
government. It can be argued justifiably, that
however, they presently receive direct payments,
albeit from consumers rather than taxpayers. This
latter payment, though, is seen by the farming
community as qualitatively different in so far as it is
based on what the farmer produces, not on what
the government thinks he or she, as a farmer,
ought to receiveJl1J Thus because the ultimate
decision-making authority in the EC, the Council of
Ministers, is made up of politicians from the
member states, the political issues involved often,
as in this example, dominate the decisions taken.
There is, however, a wider political influence
that could have an effect on the reform of the CAP.
The EC and its member states are all members of
GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Within the present 'Uruguay Round' of trade
negotiations sponsored by GATT, there is currently
great pressure on the EC from the US and the
'Cairns Group' of agricultural free traders, which all
want the EC to reduce its support for agriculture
because of the trade-distorting effects such
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intervention has; notably the use of export refunds,
which depress the world price and permit the ECto
compete, unfairly as these other countries perceive
it, in export markets.(12) Returning to the
MacSharry proposals outlined above, they could
reduce the trade distortion resulting from the CAP,
as they would cut the market prices of agricultural
products within the EC, thereby requiring much
lower export refunds on trade. Indeed, when these
proposals were announced, it was at a time when
the GATT negotiations had just collapsed
(December 1990), with the US, Cairns Group and
EC deeply divided. Not long after, the parties
reconvened, suggesting that these proposals could
possibly provide a base from which some sort of
agreement can be reached internationally.
Conclusion
Since its inception, the CAP has been a cornerstone
of the operations of the European Communities.
The policy has, however, generated much political
and economic discussion over the way in which it
operates. It has been shown that the method of
support used under the CAP has been instrumental
in generating the much publicised surpluses of
agricultural products, and also creating financial
crises for the EC. Both outcomes are predicted by
simple microeconomic theory. Although it has
been reformed over the .years, the policy is, in
essence, the same as when it was instituted over
thirty years ago, It has been suggested that in order
to survive, the EC must 'radically' reform the CAP,
in order to prepare itself for 1992 and beyond.
There are many ways in which this could be done,
just a few of which have been outlined. Although
the internal political will for effective reform has
been questioned, external factors may force
reforms. As with much else described in this article
however, the actual reform decisions, whilst
capable of being analysed using economic theory,
will probably be based more on political wilt.
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